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YOU HAVE ROUGHLY a 1 in 10,000 chance of dying in a bathtub.1
You have about a 1 in 4,800 chance of being killed by a falling object.2
You are more likely to be attacked by a cow than a shark,3 more likely
to be killed by a champagne cork than a bite from a poisonous spi-
der, 4 and if you are a red-headed male, you are more likely than any-
one else to go bald.5 Risk abounds.
But as with any other plentiful resource, systems have developed
where risk can be exploited for business gain. One such system is that
of the liability waiver, 6 in which parties agree as a condition of enter-
ing into service agreements7 not to hold each other responsible if
* Class of 2002. The author would like to thank his fiancee, Jennifer Gervasi, and
parents, Robert and Anne Nelson, for their unconditional love and support. He would also
like to thank Donna Jean Davis, University of San Francisco General Counsel, for her
invaluable insight into the topic of liability waivers.
1. See National Safety Council, What Are the Odds of Dying, http://www.nsc.org/lrs/
statinfo/odds.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2001) (statistical estimates based on 1996 data
from the National Center for Health Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau).
2. See id.
3. See Uselessfacts.net, Uselessfacts.net: Statistics, at http://www.uselessfacts.net/facts/
Statistics/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
4. See id.
5. See Uselessfacts.net, Uselessfacts.net: Health and Body, at http://www.uselessfacts.
net/facts/Health and -Body/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
6. This Comment uses the terms liability waiver, liability release, waiver, release, and
exculpatory agreement interchangeably. Liability waivers may also be referred to as as-
sumptions of risk, statements of understanding, and/or consents not to sue, and, when
contained in broader contractual agreements, indemnity or "hold harmless" clauses. See
Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: Exculpatory Agreements Under
Pressure, 14 U. MiAMi Er. & SPORTS L. REv. 1 (1997); see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 593
(7th ed. 1999).
7. Waivers may be used in any situation in which a person is asked to contractually
release a legal right or advantage. See BLACK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1575 (7th ed. 1999). This
Comment will focus only on those waivers arising in service agreements.
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something goes wrong.8 By so doing, one party is agreeing to shoulder
a risk that might otherwise have been borne by the other.9 The risk
inherent in the activity is changing hands in much the same way that
money, goods, or services would in any other business exchange.
By changing the natural allocations of risk in service agreements,
waivers change the way tort liability will be assessed. A person becomes
liable in tort when he breaches a duty owed to another, thereby caus-
ing injury.10 In service agreements, providers owe their customers a
duty to behave as any other reasonable provider would under similar
circumstances. " Should a provider's conduct dip below this "reasona-
ble provider" standard, he will be deemed negligent and therefore
liable for the customer's injury. Waivers preemptively excuse provid-
ers from liability incurred by their own negligence. 12
Even where a service provider was clearly at fault in causing a
customer's injury, that provider will not be liable as long as the cus-
tomer signed a valid exculpatory agreement.13 "[The agreement] op-
erates to extinguish the ... cause of action as effectively as would a
priorjudgment between the parties and is an absolute bar to any [law-
8. SeeJoseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth Activities-The
Alternative to "Nerf®" Tiddlywinks, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 683, 683 (1992).
9. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). A party will be liable if it negli-
gently causes injury to another, whose own conduct did not unreasonably contribute to
that injury. See id.
11. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (providing,
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard
to another ... that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct...
he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty
arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.)
(citing Heaven v. Pender, Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 283 (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must
conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.").
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a (1981) ("[A] party to a
contract can ordinarily exempt himself from liability for harm caused by his failure to
observe the standard of reasonable care imposed by the law of negligence.").
13. See id. There are limits to the degree of fault that can be dismissed by liability
waiver. Waiver terms attempting to exempt a party from tort liability for harm caused in-
tentionally or recklessly are often unenforceable on grounds of public policy. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965). Exculpatory agreements generally do not extend
to anything more serious than basic negligence. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 68, at 484 (5th ed. 1984).
[O]n the basis either of common experience as to what is intended, or of public
policy to discourage aggravated wrongs, such agreements generally are not con-
strued to cover the more extreme forms of negligence, described as willful, wan-
ton, reckless or gross, or to any conduct which constitutes an intentional tort.
Id. But see Theis v.J & J Racing Promotions, 571 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(allowing waiver to encompass gross negligence).
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suit] .... ,,14 Waivers insulate service providers from liability arising
from their services. 15 When used effectively, they help lower operating
expenses and thereby enable a greater number of providers to com-
pete in the marketplace.
Despite this obvious usefulness, waivers contravene one of the
fundamental purposes of American tort law-to encourage safety by
holding parties individually accountable for their actions. 16 "[Respon-
sibility for a] loss should lie where it has happened to fall unless some
affirmative public good will result from shifting it."'1 7 In most situa-
tions, the compelling safety purposes of maintaining tort liability",
easily outweigh any countervailing public good that might result from
dismissing it (thus no "affirmative" public good would accrue from
shifting liability). Waivers, however, constitute one of the rare excep-
tions where greater aggregate good can result from excusing tort lia-
bility rather than enforcing it. This is true because in waiver scenarios
the public safety purposes of tort law collide with one of the most
respected and deferred-to interests in American jurisprudence-the
right to contract. 19 "The [waiver] dilemma places an individual's per-
sonal freedom to enter into a voluntary agreement (contract) against
strong public policy considerations that protect that individual from
unreasonable risks (tort)."2° So far, courts have almost universally
held that in otherwise valid exculpatory agreements, the right to con-
tract slightly trumps the value of upholding tort.2' "[I] t is a matter of
14. Dresser Indust., Inc., 853 S.W.2d at 508 (citing Hart v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 189
S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1945)).
15. See Kristi L. Schoepfer, Book Review, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 465, 465 (2000) (re-
viewing DoYiCEJ. COTTEN & MARY B. CoTrEN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF WAIVERS IN SPORT, RECREA-
TION AND FITNESS ACTIVITIES (1997)). Waivers insulate providers from liability arising from
their own conduct or the conduct of their employees. See id.
16. See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory:
Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 558, 559-60 (1985) (summarizing the opinions
of a 1984 report released by the American Bar Association's Special Committee on the
Tort Liability System).
17. CLARENCE MoRIs, MORRIS ON TORTS 9 (1st ed. 1953).
18. Whether tort actually encourages public safety is debatable. See Sugarman, supra
note 16, at 558. This Comment presumes that it does.
19. See Chumney v. Stott, 381 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1963); In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202,
213 (Wis. 1991) ("[C]ourts have long recognized the importance of freedom of contract
and have endeavored to protect the right to contract.").
20. Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 3.
21. See Haines v. St. Charles Speedway, Inc., 874 F.2d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 1989); Heil
Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989); Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 695
P.2d 361, 363 (Idaho 1985); Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 941, 944
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989);
Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143, 145 (Vt. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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great public concern that freedom of contract be not lightly inter-
fered with." 22
Yet despite this widespread acceptance, courts are not particularly
fond of liability waivers. 23 "Courts have traditionally disfavored con-
tractual exclusions of negligence liability . . . and have exercised a
heightened degree of scrutiny when interpreting contractual lan-
guage which allegedly exempts a party from liability for his own negli-
gence."24 As a way of reconciling this lingering mistrust with waivers'
undeniable utility, courts have devised a system of strict, ad hoc waiver
review in which the benefits of allowing free contract exchange are
weighed against the value of upholding tort.25 This method of review
can best be characterized as a sort of "waiver scale."
The mechanics of the scale are deceptively simple: contract will
outweigh tort under most circumstances, therefore waivers will usually
be upheld. But the contract side of the scale will not be afforded full
weight unless bedrock rules of contract have been followed, 26 and the
tort side will be afforded greater weight whenever public policy de-
mands.27 If either or both of these phenomena occur, the waiver scale
will tilt away from validity and the exculpatory agreement will not be
upheld.
Problems arise not in understanding the theoretical dynamics of
the waiver scale, but rather in recognizing precisely which side causes
particular exculpatory agreements to be invalidated. 'Judicial atti-
tudes toward [waivers] have often... been characterized by ambiguity
and unpredictability."28 Consequently, it is often difficult to make out
whether courts think certain exculpatory agreements undermine the
§ 496B cmt. b (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 482 ("There is in the ordinary case
no public policy which prevents the parties from contracting as they see fit, as to whether
the plaintiff will undertake the responsibility of looking out for himself.").
22. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Williams, 17 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla. 1944).
23. See, e.g., Krazek v. Mountain Rivers Tours, Inc., 884 F.2d 163, 165 (4th Cir. 1989);
Wilson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 228, 229 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Heil Valley
Ranch, Inc., 784 P.2d at 783; Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (en banc);
Falkner, 533 N.E.2d at 945; Colgan, 553 A.2d at 145.
24. Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1207 (Me. 1979).
25. See Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 205-08 (Ohio 1998); Scott v.
Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11-13 (Wash. 1992).
26. See generally Heil Valley Ranch, Inc., 784 P.2d 781; see also Leslie Hastings, Playing
with Liability: The Risk Release in High Risk Sports, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 127, 129 (1988).
27. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1963); Scott, 834
P.2d at 11 ("There are instances where public policy reasons for preserving an obligation
of care owned by one person to another outweigh our traditional regard for freedom of
contract.").
28. King, Jr., supra note 8, at 710.
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contract side of the scale or bolster the tort side. Granted, this sort of
vagueness normally is not much of a problem; a waiver need only do
one or the other to be invalidated, and many exculpatory agreements
arguably do both. It is only when doubts arise whether particular ex-
culpatory agreements affect the waiver scale at all that waiver scale
mechanics must be closely scrutinized and understood. Waivers involv-
ing children frequently raise such doubts.
Each year, thousands of exculpatory agreements are entered into
as conditions of children being allowed to participate in activities such
as sports and summer camp. 29 Any child who has ever gone on a
school field trip has probably had to fill out his or her share of "per-
mission slips," 30 boilerplate waiver agreements in which signors (usu-
ally students and/or their parents) agree not to hold the school
responsible for injury resulting from school outings. But schools and
other organizations that make regular use of child waivers might be
shocked to learn that such agreements are presumptively invalid. Most
jurisdictions categorically prohibit all waivers purporting to release lia-
bility claims belonging to children.3'
Minor waivers can be separated into two basic categories: those
signed only by minors themselves ("minor waivers"), and those signed
by parents ("parental waivers").32 While waivers signed only by chil-
dren are far more suspect than those scrutinized and signed by par-
ents, courts often invalidate all exculpatory agreements involving
children, regardless of who signed them. The bias against minor waiv-
ers is so strong, in fact, that courts rarely even pause to explain why
such waivers are invalid. 33 Decisions dealing with minor waivers are
often "conclusory and lacking in analysis," 34 providing scant insight
into how such exculpatory agreements implicate the waiver scale.
While it is admittedly easy to see why waivers signed only by mi-
nors tilt the scale decidedly away from validity, it is far more difficult
to understand how the scale is implicated by parental waivers. The vast
29. See Cooper v. United States Ski Ass'n, 32 P.2d 502, 507 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
30. Permission slips are essentially acknowledgement forms in which parents give writ-
ten permission for their children to participate in school field trips. Many such slips also
contain language releasing the respective schools sponsoring the trips from liability.
31. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12; see also Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605, 607 (1st
Cir. 1960); Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 468 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1958); Kotary v. Spencer Speedway, Inc., 365 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (App. Div. 1975);
King, Jr., supra note 8, at 713.
32. Waivers may also be signed by both parents and children.
33. See King, Jr., supra note 8, at 715.
34. Id.
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majority of jurisdictions also prevent parents from waiving their chil-
dren's tort liability claims. 35 According to the waiver scale, then, these
waivers must either undermine the contract side of the waiver scale or
bolster the tort side.
Although decisions involving parental waivers are arguably more
curt and conclusory than those involving minor waivers,3 6 it is evident
that some courts believe parental exculpatory agreements violate es-
tablished rules of contract,3 7 while others believe such agreements cre-
ate heightened tort interests to protect children.38  Parental
exculpatory agreements should admittedly be invalidated if they ei-
ther undermine the contract side of the waiver scale or augment the
tort side. As this Comment argues, however, recent decisions have
clearly shown that parental waivers do not affect either side of the
waiver scale.3 9
Regarding the contract side, no contract rules are broken when a
parent, acting in the child's best interests, decides to waive that child's
potential liability claims. 40 According to the recent United States Su-
preme Court case of Troxel v. Granville,41 a parent's right to make deci-
sions affecting the care, custody, and control of the child is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. 42 This right clearly should encompass the
ability to enter into parental exculpatory agreements.
Regarding the tort side, there are no convincing public policy
reasons why the need for tort liability should outweigh a parent's right
to enter into exculpatory agreements on their child's behalf. Parents
executing these waivers are well equipped to avoid unfairly stilted ex-
culpatory agreements. As such, parental waivers also do not augment
the tort side of the waiver scale.
Given that parental waivers do not alter the default, pro-validity
balance of the waiver scale, there is no reason why they should not be
categorically upheld. This Comment argues that longstanding com-
mon law rules against parental exculpatory agreements should be uni-
35. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12; Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 6; King, Jr., supra note 8, at
715.
36. See Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 6.
37. See id.
38. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12.
39. See generally id.; Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Cooper v. United States
Ski Ass'n, 32 P.2d 502 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
40. See Troxel, 57 U.S. at 66; Cooper, 32 P.2d at 507.
41. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
42. See Troxel, 57 U.S. at 66.
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versally revoked, either by state legislation or court action. Part I
outlines the background of American waiver law, focusing on the key
exceptions to waiver validity and how they affect the waiver scale. Part
II describes the social costs of preventing parental waivers, as well as
the widely divergent paths courts have taken in deciding the question
of parental waiver validity. Finally, Part III argues that Troxel and other
recent cases clearly show that parental waivers do not undermine the
contract side of the waiver scale or enhance the tort side.
I. Background
A. Overview of Waiver Law
1. Nature and History of Exculpatory Agreements
Waiver is a hybrid of contract and tort law, growing from the inev-
itable convergence of the right to contract and the duty to take re-
sponsibility for one's actions. 43 Since the Industrial Revolution, courts
have recognized the firm and unavoidable duty to avoid causing harm
through negligent acts as the cornerstone principle of tort law. 44
Moreover, duty is a commodity, and according to the gospel of con-
tract law, commodities may change hands whenever the parties so
intend.45
Given the inherent compatibility of these two concepts, the evolu-
tion of a system whereby tort duty could be waived as consideration
for contract agreements was as inevitable as the subsequent problems
and uncertainties that have since plagued American waiver law. Waiv-
ers "are basically written documents in which one party agrees to re-
lease, or 'exculpate,' another from potential tort liability for future
conduct covered in the agreement."46 Although waivers may be im-
plied through conduct,47 such as when an athlete impliedly agrees to
43. See Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D. Colo. 1992)
(citing Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989)); see also Arango &
Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 3.
44. See, e.g., Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv.
359, 364-65 (1951).
45. See Wendell H. Holmes, The Freedom Not to Contract, 60 TUL. L. REv. 751, 751-52
(1986).
46. King, Jr., supra note 8, at 683.
47. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1581 (6th ed. 1990).
A waiver is implied where one party has pursued such a course of conduct with
reference to the other party as to evidence an intention to waive his rights or the
advantage to which he may be entitled, or where the conduct pursued is inconsis-
tent with any other honest intention than an intention of such waiver, provided
that the other party concerned has been induced by such conduct to act upon the
belief that there has been a waiver, and has incurred trouble or expense thereby.
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release opponents from negligence liability by playing in a sandlot
football game, 48 this Comment will focus only on those waivers ex-
pressly established by written documents. Express, written waivers
arise when parties are asked to sign contracts agreeing to relinquish
legal rights as a condition of being allowed to obtain a service. They
are frequently used by providers of recreational services and facilities
such as scuba diving, parachuting, summer camps, and youth sports
leagues. 49
Exculpatory releases "may take many forms, but all such clauses
have one thing in common in that they exempt a party from liability
which he would have borne had it not been for the clause."50 Two of
the "most commonly used releases are the waiver of liability[,] and the
express assumption of risk." 51 Under the waiver of liability, a party is
asked to sign a "written instrument in which the participant agrees not
to hold the provider liable for any injuries or damages resulting from
the provider's negligence. '52 Waivers of liability constitute affirmative
agreements between parties not to sue one another in the event of
injury.
Express assumptions of risk provide the same level of protection
as waivers, but in a slightly different manner. 53 Rather than asking a
participant to affirmatively agree not to sue a service provider, express
assumptions of risk arise "when the [participant], in advance, ex-
pressly consents... 'to relieve the [provider] of an obligation of con-
duct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk
arising from what the [provider] is to do or leave undone .. . .' 54 In
other words, the participant expressly acknowledges that the service
provider has no duty to guard against the kinds of harm encompassed
by the exculpatory agreement. "The result is that ... being under no
duty, [the provider] cannot be charged with negligence. '55
Id.
48. See generally Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
49. See, e.g., Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 10.
50. P.S. ATTIVAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 167 (3d ed. 1981).
51. Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 7-8.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 8. Whereas express waivers of liability can be viewed as erecting defenses
atop potential negligence claims, assumptions of risk defend against negligence by ensur-
ing that the necessary elements for negligence never crystallize. See id. "[T]he fact that the
[waiver] uses the words 'hold harmless' rather than the word 'release' does not signifi-
candy impact the issue of whether the effect was to exculpate ...." Scott v. Pac. W. Moun-
tain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 10 (Wash. 1992).
54. Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, 276 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (Ct. App. 1990) (citations
omitted).
55. Id.
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2. A Cold Reception: Judicial Wariness Toward Exculpatory
Agreements
Since their very inception, exculpatory agreements have been
frowned upon by courts that looked askance at contractual arrange-
ments purporting to excuse individual tort liability. 56 Given the para-
mount importance of tort as a deterrent to dangerous conduct, many
courts were loathe to allow parties to contractually release each other
from their inherent duties of due care.5 7 "To relieve oneself of liability
for one's own negligence may encourage carelessness." 58 Judicial dis-
approval of exculpatory agreements may have been further fueled by
an innate respect for tort rights, 59 as well as the immense value such
rights convey to accident victims themselves. 60
Yet despite these and other misgivings, most courts recognized
the inherent tension in exculpatory agreements between the right to
contract and the need to enforce tort liability. 61 To these courts, the
social value of enforcing tort liability should be placed on one side of
a scale, with the individual right to contract resting on the other.62
Whether a particular exculpatory agreement will be voided or en-
forced depends entirely on how its proverbial scales even out.
56. See Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1207 (Me. 1979); see also Scott, 834 P.2d
at 9-10; King, Jr., supra note 8, at 710.
57. See Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 23.
58. Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
59. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849
(1987) (arguing that personal rights should be "market inalienable"). "Something that is
market-inalienable is not to be sold, which in our economic system means it is not to be
traded in the market." Id. at 1850. According to Radin, rights that are inherently personal
should not be treated as commodities lest those trading in such rights suffer "violence to
personhood." Id. at 1907. But see King, Jr., supra note 8, at 735 ("[T]he possibility of bring-
ing a tort claim . . . for unintentional injures [sic] .. .is simply less crucial to personhood
than the interest in having available the activities and relationships that depend on
volunteers.").
60. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 12. One of the fundamental arguments the court made in
voiding parental exculpatory agreements was that children should not be deprived of tort
recovery rights that may, in some cases, be their only means of financial support. See id.
61. See Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ohio 1998); see also
Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[N]o
public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one party, for a considera-
tion, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon the other
party.. . .") (quoting Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1963));
see also King, Jr., supra note 8, at 710-11; Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 3.
62. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 11; see also Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 204-06.
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B. Mechanics of the Waiver Scale
Using this basic "waiver scale" approach, most courts have be-
grudgingly held that, under normal circumstances, the right to con-
tract slightly outweighs the social value of upholding tort liability.63
When circumstances are not "normal," however, this default, pro-
waiver balance can be easily disrupted.64 Context and circumstance
determine the relative weights that will be assigned to the contract
and tort sides of the waiver scale in each particular situation. Courts
will therefore engage in detailed, fact-specific reviews of challenged
exculpatory agreements to determine whether any unusual factors tilt
the scales abnormally in favor of tort.65
These "tilt" factors are essentially exceptions to the general rule
of waiver validity66 and can be separated into two broad categories:
those rooted in rules of contract and those stemming from basic no-
tions of public policy. 67 Although the rationale behind many of the
contract-rooted exceptions is admittedly that public policy requires
them, 68 courts often cite public policy as an entirely separate category
of waiver exceptions. 69 Therefore, it is easier to understand the waiver
scale if contract and public policy are viewed as discrete avenues by
which exculpatory agreements can be invalidated.
With contract-rooted exceptions, the contract side of a waiver
equation will not be afforded full weight unless the basic rules of con-
tract are fulfilled.70 If an exculpatory agreement was not properly
63. See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 443 n.6 ("The view that the exculpatory contract is valid...
represents the majority holding in the United States."). Exculpatory agreements are up-
held "begrudgingly" given that they are disfavored under the law. See id.
64. Since exculpatory agreements are disfavored, courts will seize upon the slightest
problem or deficiency as a means of invalidating them. See Arango & Trueba,Jr., supra note
6, at 11 ("Although the tide [against exculpatory agreements] has changed, whenever...
drafting deficiencies reemerged, courts quickly invalidated the agreement.").
65. See generally Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1207-08 (Me. 1979); Scott, 834
P.2d at 9; Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 204-06; King, Jr., supra note 8, at 710.
66. See Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); King,
Jr., supra note 8, at 711.
67. See generally Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 10-22; Angeline Purdy, Scott v.
Pacific West Mountain Resort: Erroneously Invalidating Parental Releases of a Minor's Future
Claim, 68 WASH. L. REv. 457, 460-61 (1993).
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
69. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1963); Scott, 834
P.2d at 11-12 (Wash. 1992); King, Jr., supra note 8, at 721-26.
70. See Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 663 (Wis. 1991); Street v. Darwin
Ranch, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (D. Wyo. 1999); Hastings, supra note 26, at 129;
Schoepfer, supra note 15, at 465-66. The "basic rules" of contract that must be fulfilled
include those typically required to evince that the parties clearly intended to be bound by a
contractual agreement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) ("[T]he
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drafted, 71 for example, then the contract side of the scale will be un-
dermined and the tort side will prevail.
With public policy-rooted exceptions, the social interests in up-
holding tort liability will, under certain circumstances, be afforded
greater weight than they would in normal waiver scenarios. 7 2 If a
waiver is used to release liability for extreme misconduct, for instance,
the social interests in dissuading such conduct will be afforded greater
weight than if the waiver sought to release claims for mere negli-
gence. 73 The enhanced tort side would counterbalance even the full
weight of the contract side, tilting the waiver scale away from validity.
The mechanics are analogous to a playground seesaw with a
group of very small children piled onto one side and one very large
child plopped on the other. Unless all the smaller children squeeze
onto their side of the seesaw, there is no way they will ever be able to
tilt the board their way. Such is the case with contract rules, all of
which must be satisfied if the contract side has any hope of weighing
down public policy.74
Conversely, the larger child need only be handed the added
weight of an ice cream cone in order to tilt the seesaw away from the
full weight of the "contract children." The public policy interests in
upholding liability, afforded significant weight to begin with, require
only slight nuances to shift the waiver scale decidedly in favor of tort.75
1. Contract-Rooted Tilts of the Waiver Scale
The contract side of the waiver equation will not be afforded due
weight unless the parties to an exculpatory agreement fully intended
to release each other from potential tort liability when the agreement
formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual
assent to the exchange ....").
71. See Schoepfer, supra note 15, at 465.
72. See Tunkl 383 P.2d at 443; Scott, 834 P.2d at 11; Street, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1301;
Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 12-16.
73. See generally Reece v. Finch, 562 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 1990); Boehm v. Cody County
Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704 (Wyo. 1987); L. Luria & Son, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
460 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); King,Jr., supra note 8, at 727-31; see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CoNrTRACTS § 195(1) (1981) ("A term exempting a party from tort liabil-
ity for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy.").
74. See Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 11. (" [W] henever... drafting deficien-
cies reemerged, courts quickly invalidated [exculpatory] agreement[s].").
75. Waivers are disfavored because the public policy interests in upholding tort are so
significant to begin with. See King, Jr., supra note 8, at 721-25; Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra
note 6, at 24.
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was drafted.76 Waivers will be deemed to embody the parties' intent
only where bedrock rules of drafting, presentation, and bargaining
equality have been met.77
a. Waiver Drafting
Regarding drafting, waivers will be upheld only when they are
written in language that unambiguously conveys to signors exactly
what rights they are relinquishing.78 Whether a waiver will be deemed
unambiguous depends on how effectively it conveys to the signor the
practical effects of the agreement.79 If a reasonable signor could not
possibly have understood what the waiver language meant, then that
person cannot later be said to have voluntarily consented to the
waiver's terms. Waivers have traditionally been invalidated on drafting
grounds due to "'legal-eze' language rendering the contract not
understandable. "80
Waiver language will be deemed unambiguous only if it is basic
enough to be comprehended by the average reader, while at the same
time technical enough to adequately explain the legal rights being
relinquished.8' Although this requirement theoretically places waiver
drafters between the "Scylla of simplicity and the Charybdis of com-
pleteness," 2 most courts do not require waiver language to specifically
76. See Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063,1067 (Wyo. 1988); Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Bus. Men's Ass'n, 224 A.2d 620, 623 (1966) ("[Exculpatory
agreements] 'must spell out the intention of the parties with the greatest of particular-
ity' . . . and show the intent to release from liability beyond doubt ....") (quoting Morton
v. Ambridge Borough, 101 A.2d 661, 663 (Pa. 1954)).
77. See Douglass v. Skiing Standards, Inc., 459 A.2d 97, 98 (Vt. 1983); Dresser Indus.,
Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993) ("[A] party seeking indem-
nity from the consequences of that party's own negligence must express that intent in
specific terms within the four corners of the contract."); Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note
6, at 10; Schoepfer, supra note 15, at 465-66; King, Jr., supra note 8, at 720-22.
78. See Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 (Me. 1979); Milligan, 754 P.2d at
1067; Douglass, 459 A.2d at 98; Schoepfer, supra note 15, at 465.
79. See Doyle, 403 A.2d at 1207 ("If an express agreement exempting the defendant
from liability for his negligence is to be sustained, it must appear that its terms were
brought home to the plaintiff. ) (quoting W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed.
1971)).
80. Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 10.
81. See Nat'l & Int'l Bhd. of St. Racers, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 264 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46 (Ct.
App. 1989) ("[l]f short and to the point, a release will be challenged as failing to mention
the particular risk which caused a plaintiff's injuries .... If ... comprehensive, the release
is attacked as unduly lengthy ....").
82. Id. at 46. Scylla and Charybdis were figures in Greek mythology who terrorized
sailors off the coast of Sicily. Scylla was a female sea monster who lived in a cave just oppo-
site Charybdis, a giant whirlpool. Vessels attempting to avoid one would ultimately fall prey
to the other. The idiom "between Scylla and Charybdis" is often used to describe situations
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spell out every type of conduct8 3 and activity8 4 encompassed by the
exculpatory agreement. "[0] nly on Draftsman's Olympus is it feasible
to combine the elegance of a thrust indenture with the brevity of a
stop sign . ... 85 Rather, in interpreting the scope of a waiver, "it
seems best to respect the intention of the parties which seldom con-
templates that the agreement will specifically identify each potential
risk . * "86 Courts will often gauge the intentions of the respective
parties to an exculpatory agreement by scrutinizing the overall lan-
guage of the agreement itself.8 7
As a practical matter, many service industries have already
learned from trial and error precisely which waiver language will stand
up in court. For example, "the [recreational sports industry] learned
from its prior mistakes by increasing type size and using easily under-
standable English instead of technical legal terms, thus removing any
objection as to the clarity or ambiguity of the rights being waived." 88
b. Waiver Presentation
As to presentation, waiver language must be conspicuously dis-
played in order to be valid. 89 Whether waiver language is conspicuous
will depend on how it appears in the document in which it is con-
tained.90 If a reasonable signor would not have noticed the waiver in
the first place, then that person cannot later be deemed to have in-
where avoiding one danger invariably exposes a person to another. See WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2045 (1993).
83. See Krazek v. Mountain Rivers Tours, Inc., 884 F.2d 163, 166 (4th Cir. 1989); Heil
Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 785 (Colo. 1989); King, Jr., supra note 8, at
711-12. But see Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(requiring the word "negligence" be used in exculpatory agreements in order for those
agreements to release potential tort claims for negligence).
84. See Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) ("It is not necessary that the parties anticipate the precise circumstances which re-
sulted in the decedent's accident, where ... the broad language in the exculpatory clause
contemplated a wide range of risks. . . ."). But see Dobratz v. Thompson, 468 N.W.2d 654,
663 (Wis. 1991) (exculpatory agreement deemed ambiguous and therefore unenforceable
since it failed to specifically identify the type of activity that caused injury).
85. Nat'l & Int'l Bhd. of St. Racers, Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
86. King, Jr., supra note 8, at 712.
87. See id.
88. Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 10.
89. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993)
("[S]omething must appear on the face of the [contract] to attract the attention of a rea-
sonable person when he looks at it.") (quoting Ling & Co. v. Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n.,
482 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1972)); see also Purdy, supra note 67, at 460; Schoepfer, supra
note 15, at 465-66.
90. See Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 511; Schoepfer, supra note 15, at 465-66.
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tended to consent to its terms. 91 Conspicuousness challenges will
often be sustained where waiver language was hidden in a nondescript
paragraph in the middle of a document or stamped in small print on
the back of a receipt.92
Generally, waivers will be deemed conspicuous where they are
somehow "set off' in the documents in which they appear, either by
being set in bold and/or capital letters, or by appearing beneath a
conspicuous and clearly labeled heading.93 Waiver language may also
be deemed conspicuous where it is the only text appearing on the
page of a document.9 4
c. Fraud, Unconscionability, and Incapacity
Other contract-based exceptions to the general rule of waiver va-
lidity include fraud, unconscionability, and incapacity of the signor.95
Exculpatory agreements obtained through fraud will be deemed un-
enforceable under the same rubric of protecting party intent 96-if a
party was induced to sign a waiver by material misrepresentations, 97
then that waiver cannot be an accurate representation of the party's
intent.
Under an unconscionability rationale, courts will often find ex-
culpatory agreements to be impermissible contracts of adhesion re-
sulting from gross disparities in bargaining power.98 If a signor had no
91. See Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 510 (adopting conspicuousness standards articulated in
the Texas Business and Commerce Code: "When a reasonable person against whom a
clause is to operate ought to have noticed it, the clause is conspicuous.").
92. See Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D. Utah 1993); see
also Hastings, supra note 26, at 136-37.
93. See Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 511 ("[L]anguage in capital headings ... contrasting
type or color . .. and . .. in an extremely short document, such as a telegram, is
conspicuous.").
94. See id. at 510.
95. See King, Jr., supra note 8, at 713-28; Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 5-8;
Schoepfer, supra note 15, at 466.
96. See generally Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. 1982); Dobratz v. Thomson,
468 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 (1981) ("If a
misrepresentation ... induces conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by one
who neither knows nor has reasonable opportunity to know of the character or essential
terms of the proposed contract, his conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.").
97. Courts disagree whether actual reliance by the signor must be shown in order to
claim fraud. See King, Jr., supra note 8, at 726 n.180. See generally Merten, 321 N.W.2d 173
(proof of reliance not needed to claim fraud). But see Barnes v. Birmingham Int'l. Raceway,
551 So. 2d 929 (Ala. 1989) (reliance required).
98. SeeJones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 374 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Fedor v. Mauwehu
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 143 A.2d 466, 467 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958); King, Jr., supra
note 8, at 720. It is often difficult to predict how disparate bargaining positions must be in
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choice but to enter into the agreement, then the waiver could not
have been entirely voluntary, 99 thus undermining the contract side of
the waiver equation.
Regarding incapacity of the signor, many courts follow a seem-
ingly per se rule of voidability for exculpatory agreements signed by or
on behalf of minors and incompetents. 100 Since minors and incompe-
tents traditionally have lacked capacity under the law to bind them-
selves to all but the most essential agreements, 1 1 they therefore have
not been allowed to contractually release future liability claims. Mi-
nors that have attempted to bind themselves to exculpatory agree-
ments have typically been "given the power to disaffirm [such]
agreement[s] during minority and within a reasonable or specified
period after reaching majority."'10 2
Although courts often invoke contract rules when invalidating ex-
culpatory agreements due to fraud, unconscionability, or incapacity,
the underlying rationale behind such invalidations is often public pol-
icy. 103 Both the contract and tort sides of the waiver scale therefore
may be implicated by situations involving fraud, unconscionability, or
incapacity. Whether invalidations of waivers on these grounds are
seen as undermining the contract side of the waiver scale or bolstering
the tort side, the resulting tilt of the scale is the same.
order for a court to invalidate an exculpatory agreement under an unconscionability ratio-
nale. See King, Jr., supra note 8, at 720. Some courts state that a lack of opportunity for
negotiation or the fact that services could not be obtained elsewhere justify invalidation. See
Dresse4 623 P.2d at 374; see also King, Jr., supra note 8, at 720. Other courts, however, state
that "take it or leave it" exculpatory agreements are not inherently contracts of adhesion.
See Dressel, 623 P.2d at 375; Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 4.
99. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981) "[A] bar-
gain [is] said to be unconscionable.., if it was 'such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make ... .'" Id. (quoting Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889)).
100. See Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir. 1960);
Dressel, 623 P.2d at 372 n.1, 373; Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1989); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 10-11 (Wash. 1992); King, Jr.,
supra note 8, at 713-14. But see Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647,
649-50 (Ct. App. 1990); Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12(1)-(2) (1981). Infants, the men-
tally ill, persons under guardianship, or persons under the influence of intoxicants do not
have the capacity to incur contractual duties by manifesting assent to a transaction. See id.
Those lacking capacity to contract are, however, granted limited fights to enter into bind-
ing contracts for "necessaries." See id. at § 12 cmt. f (1981).
102. King, Jr., supra note 8, at 713. Minority extends until age eighteen. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 997 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of "minor").
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
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2. Public Policy Based Tilts
The tort side of the waiver equation will be afforded greater
weight whenever public policy dictates that greater social benefit will
result from enforcing liability than from respecting the right to con-
tract. 10 4 Although contract will outweigh tort in most situations, unu-
sual circumstances can sometimes augment the value of enforcing
liability. 10 5 Courts generally will find a heightened social interest in
upholding tort liability in four basic scenarios: When a waiver is being
used in the context of services that are highly important or essential to
the public;106 when the waiver is asking signors to release liability for
extreme conduct such as gross negligence, recklessness, or willful mis-
conduct;10 7 when the waiver is seeking to release a duty of care estab-
lished by statute; 0 8 and when the waiver is being used by or on behalf
of children. 09
a. Waivers Used in Services Necessary to the Public Good
Waivers used in important or essential services are effectively con-
tracts of adhesion." 0 Since these types of exculpatory agreements will
produce the same end tilt of the waiver scale either by undermining
the contract side or bolstering the tort side, it is not as important to
pinpoint which side of the waiver scale they affect as it is to distinguish
what types of services will be deemed "necessary or essential" to the
public good. In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California,"' the
California Supreme Court articulated six criteria to help gauge when
104. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 11; Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441,
445-47 (Cal. 1963).
105. See generally Tunkl, 383 P.2d 441; Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968
(Wash. 1988); Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 12-16.
106. See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445; Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972; Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d
370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); King, Jr., supra note 8, at 721-26.
107. See generally Reece v. Finch, 562 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 1990); see also L. Luria & Son, Inc.
v. Honeywell, Inc., 460 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Barnes v. Birmingham Int'l
Raceway, Inc., 551 So. 2d 929, 933 (Ala. 1989); Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc.,
533 N.E.2d 941, 946 (I11. Ct. App. 1989); King, Jr., supra note 8, at 727-31; Arango &
Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 13.
108. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (West 1987) (exculpatory agreements for physical
injury invalid); Meier v. Ma-Do Bars, Inc., 484 N.Y.S.2d 719, 720 (App. Div. 1985); King, Jr.,
supra note 8, at 725-27.
109. See Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Me. 1979); see also Childress
v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12;
King, Jr., supra note 8, at 713-21.
110. See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445-46; King, Jr., supra note 8, at 721.
111. 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
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a service is necessary or essential to the public good.1 12 According to
the court in Tunkl, a party should not be allowed to use exculpatory
agreements when:
[The agreement] concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is en-
gaged in performing a service of great importance to the public,
which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of
the public. The party holds himself out as willing to perform this
service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for
any member coming within certain established standards. As a re-
sult of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting
of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a deci-
sive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the
public who seeks his services. In exercising superior bargaining
power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a pur-
chaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection
against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the per-
son or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the
seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his
agents.113
None of these criteria are by themselves dispositive, and a waiver
need not exhibit all to be invalidated. 114 Those services that do not
satisfy the Tunkl criteria will be deemed primarily recreational and,
barring some other countervailing considerations, will be allowed to
use exculpatory agreements. 1 5 A number of other states besides Cali-
fornia have adopted Tunkl-like tests for gauging necessary or essential
services, including Tennessee, 116 Washington, 117 and Colorado.11 8 In
addition to hospitalization and health care, services that have been
deemed necessary and essential to the public good include banking
and escrow services, activities involving common carriers, and public
school sports programs.11 9
112. See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445-47.
113. Id. at 445-46.
114. See id. at 447.
115. See id. at 446.
116. See Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
117. See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 973 (Wash. 1988).
118. SeeJones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376-77 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
119. See Buchan v. United States Cycling Fed'n, Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr. 887, 897 (Ct. App.
1991); see also Okura v. United States Cycling Fed'n, Inc., 231 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (Ct. App.
1986); Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 13. A designation of "necessary or essential"
does not necessarily mean that all of an entity's services will be precluded from using excul-
patory agreements. Schools or community centers that are essential can provide extracur-
ricular, non-essential services that will be allowed to use exculpatory agreements. See
Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 4 ("[B]usinesses which normally operate under a public duty ...
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b. Waivers Seeking to Release Liability for Extreme Conduct
Where waivers purport to release liability for extreme conduct
such as gross negligence, recklessness, and willful misconduct, courts
generally agree that the heightened public policy interests in dissuad-
ing such conduct outweigh the individual right to contract. 120 Waivers
seeking to release liability for willful misdeeds and recklessness are
almost universally rejected as overreaching.1 2 1 Most states also pro-
hibit waivers from releasing claims for gross negligence or anything
else rising above "garden variety" negligence.' 22
c. Waivers of Statutorily Mandated Standards of Care
Waivers can also be voided if they attempt to release liability for
conduct falling below some statutorily mandated minimum stan-
dard.123 Some states have statutes requiring service providers to con-
form to the standards of care expected of members of their
profession. 24 Having been established specifically by legislative man-
date, such standards will place greater weight onto the tort side of the
waiver scale.
can execute valid exculpation contracts when the transaction ... is not under that public
duty.").
120. See generally Reece v. Finch, 562 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 1990); L. Luria & Son, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 460 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Barnes v. Birmingham Int'l
Raceway, Inc., 551 So. 2d 929 (Ala. 1989); Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533
N.E.2d 941 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989); King, Jr., supra note 8, at 727-31; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981); KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 480-84.
121. See Reece, 562 So. 2d at 198-201; Barnes, 551 So. 2d at 933; King, Jr., supra note 8, at
727-28; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981); KEETON ET AL., supra note
13, at 480-84. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965) (recognizing a right
to enter into valid exculpatory agreements that preclude liability for both negligent and
reckless conduct).
122. See Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d 485, 488 (Md. Ct. App. 1986); see also King, Jr.,
supra note 8, at 727-31. Plaintiffs that have signed binding waivers can still attempt to bring
negligence actions by framing their claims as gross negligence. See King,Jr., supra note 8, at
730. Some commentators have therefore criticized the practice of allowing waivers to re-
lease claims for negligence but not claims for recklessness or gross negligence. See King, Jr.,
supra note 8, at 731. "The problem with invalidating exculpatory agreements for more
serious kinds of unintentional conduct is that it assumes we can know what recklessness
and gross negligence are and how they differ from ordinary negligence." King, Jr., supra
note 8, at 730.
123. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (West 1987) (exculpatory agreements for physical
injury invalid); see also Meier v. Ma-Do Bars, Inc., 484 N.Y.S.2d 719, 720 (App. Div. 1985);
King, Jr., supra note 8, at 725-27.
124. See Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 695 P.2d 361, 364 (Idaho 1984) (citing Chapter 12, Title
6 of the Idaho Code, which requires that saddle service providers conform to the standard
of care expected of members of their profession); King, Jr., supra note 8, at 725-26.
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3. Minor Waivers: Contract or Public Policy Based Tilt?
Similar to those situations where exculpatory agreements consti-
tute fraud or contracts of adhesion, waivers used on minors implicate
both contract' 25 and public policy rationales. 126 Many courts cite per
se contract rules against minor exculpatory agreements, indicating
that such agreements undermine the contract side of the waiver
scale. 127 "A general public policy analysis has seldom been reached in
connection with exculpatory agreements relating to youth... activi-
ties because these cases have usually been decided on the threshold
basis of the minor status of the participants."1 28 Some courts, however,
have gone so far as to rationalize that public policy interests are
heightened when waivers are used on minors, indicating that the tort
side of the waiver scale should be afforded greater weight in minor
waiver scenarios.1 29
Although courts generally apply the same rules to waivers signed
only by children that they do to waivers signed by parents, minor waiv-
ers involve vastly different considerations than parental waivers. It is
therefore necessary to distinguish the two in order to fully understand
how each one implicates the waiver scale.
a. Minor Waivers
As of this writing, most jurisdictions in the United States had rec-
ognized that waivers executed by those who lack the capacity to con-
tract are per se invalid.' 30 Despite the fact that minors are afforded
limited rights to enter into agreements for "necessaries," 131 waivers
are considered to be well beyond their contract capabilities. As the
125. See Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir. 1960);
Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 372 n.1 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403
A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Me. 1979); Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1989); King, Jr., supra note 8, at 713-21.
126. See Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 142
(E.D. Pa. 1987); Dressel, 623 P.2d at 373 n.1; Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am.,
Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 468 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834
P.2d 6, 11-12 (Wash. 1992).
127. See Del Santo, 273 F.2d at 607; see also Dressel, 623 P.2d at 372 n.1; Doyle, 403 A.2d at
1208 n.3; Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 6-7; King, Jr., supra note 8, at 713-21.
128. King, Jr., supra note 8, at 724.
129. See Simmons, 670 F. Supp. at 142; Dressel, 623 P.2d at 373 n.1; Fedor, 143 A.2d at 468;
Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12.
130. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12; Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 6; Del Santo, 273 F.2d at 607
(applying Massachusetts law); Fedor, 143 A.2d at 468; Kotary v. Spencer Speedway, Inc., 365
N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (App. Div. 1975); King, Jr., supra note 8, at 713.
131. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcTs § 4.5 (2d ed. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
ONr) OF CONTRAcTs § 12 cmt. f (1981).
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Mississippi Supreme Court stated, "[m] inors can waive nothing. In the
law they are helpless, so much so that their representatives can waive
nothing for them ... ,"132
Preventing minors from waiving tort liability themselves makes
good sense according to the waiver scale. Fundamental contract rules
prohibiting minors from entering into binding agreements are vio-
lated if children are allowed to waive liability claims, 133 and the
unique vulnerability of minors to both exploitation and bad business
decisions creates a heightened public policy interest in protecting
them from exculpatory agreements.1 34 Minor waivers therefore pro-
duce a decisive double-tilt of the waiver scale.
b. Parental Waivers
In contrast, parental exculpatory agreements do not clearly impli-
cate either side of the scale. Although courts often reflexively invali-
date parental waivers according to "settled law,"' 35 no compelling
rationale has ever been articulated why parents should not be allowed
to release their children's tort liability claims. There are no obvious
defects in the contract side of parental waiver equations, thus the nor-
mally compelling weight afforded to contract need not be under-
mined. Minors also are not nearly as vulnerable to bad decisions or
exploitation by adults when their parents are scrutinizing waivers for
them. Thus, the public policy side of the parental waiver scale is not as
clearly augmented as it is with minor waivers.
Given the seemingly porous foundation upon which parental
waiver rules rest, it is not surprising that courts and commentators
have begun sporadic attacks on the traditional rule against parental
waiver validity.136 Those attacks were first launched in 1990 with the
California appellate court case of Hohe v. San Diego Unified School Dis-
trict, 13 7 the harbinger of what has since become a decade-long reexam-
ination of judicial attitudes toward parental exculpatory agreements.
132. Khoury v. Saik, 33 So. 2d 616, 618 (Miss. 1948).
133. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 131, at § 4.5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 12 cmt. f (1981).
134. See Simmons, 670 F. Supp. at 142; Dressel, 623 P.2d at 373 n.i; Fedor, 143 A.2d at 468;
Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12.
135. Scott, 834 P.2d at 11.
136. See Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (Ct. App. 1990);
see a/so Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 275 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 805 (Ct. App. 1990);
Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998); Cooper v. United States
Ski Ass'n, 32 P.2d 502, 507 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); King, Jr., supra note 8, at 715; Purdy,
supra note 67, at 466-70.
137. 274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1990).
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Since Hohe, in which the court abruptly and with little explanation
announced that parents can indeed waive their children's liability
claims, 138 courts from Ohio to Colorado to Washington have revisited
the question of parental waiver validity.'39 The resulting rulings, find-
ing parental waivers to be either valid, 140 invalid,' 4 ' or somewhere in
between,1 42 have seriously clouded the question of parental waiver va-
lidity. In so doing, these decisions have confused and hamstrung those
entities that must rely on parental exculpatory agreements for liability
protection, including businesses, schools, and volunteer
organizations.
1I. Problem
Preventing parents from waiving their children's tort claims in-
creases insurance premiums for service providers. 143 These higher
costs can then either put the service provider out of business, force
the provider to eliminate the parts of his or her business catering to
minors, or be passed on to consumers. 144 While arguments might be
made that higher liability costs force inept or unwilling service provid-
ers out of the marketplace, such arguments become strained when
applied to recreational services that benefit minors, particularly chari-
table services such as sports leagues, summer day camps, and after-
school youth programs. 145 Recreational services provide important
public benefits that would be significantly reduced if even a small
number of providers were put out of business. 146
Although doomsday predictions of runaway liability for recrea-
tional sports leagues have not yet come to pass,147 service providers
catering to children live under constant threat of legal attack. In the
modern era of marathon court battles and multi-million dollar jury
awards, even a single lawsuit can prove fatal to many small and me-
138. See id. at 649.
139. See Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205; Cooper, 32 P.2d at 507; Scott, 834 P.2d at 11.
140. See Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649; Aaris, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 805; Cooper, 32 P.2d at 507.
141. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12.
142. See Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205 (carving out a limited exception whereby parental
waivers could be valid when used in the context of volunteer, recreational activities).
143. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 12 ("[I]nvalidation of releases signed by parents to bar chil-
dren's claims would make sports engaged in by minors prohibitively expensive due to in-
surance costs.").
144. See Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 47-48.
145. See Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205; King, Jr., supra note 8, at 685-92.
146. See Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205; see also King, Jr., supra note 8, at 685-92.
147. See generally Andrew F. Popper, A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the Vulnera-
ble, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 123 (1998).
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dium sized service providers. As of 1997, legal defense costs alone for
tort lawsuits ranged anywhere from $20,000 to $600,000.148 These
costs often pale in comparison to jury damage awards. "Notwithstand-
ing legal fees, judgments against . . .providers may also be exces-
sive." 149 Without valid exculpatory agreements to protect themselves
against such judgments, service providers may only be a single acci-
dent away from complete financial ruin.
But even if parents are not able to waive their children's liability
claims, a firm, well-reasoned rule articulating this would be preferable
to the confusion and inconsistency that currently plagues waiver law.
One of the primary purposes of exculpatory agreements is to allow
service providers to avoid the staggering costs of having to decide re-
sponsibility for injuries in court. That purpose is obviously frustrated
when the very validity of parental exculpatory agreements can be con-
stantly questioned.
Service providers also need clear rules governing parental waivers
in order to make intelligent business decisions. If providers know for
sure that they will not be able to protect themselves with parental ex-
culpatory agreements, those providers will at least be able to make
rational, individualized choices whether they want to run the risk of
liability or get out of the minor market altogether. But when service
providers have no way of knowing whether parental exculpatory
agreements are inherently invalid, those providers can only guess at
the risks involved in catering to minors. Fundamental fairness de-
mands that these providers be able to know in advance of litigation
whether they can rely on otherwise sound parental waivers to protect
themselves.
A. A Decade of Parental Waiver Review: 1990-2000
1. A Chink in the Armor: Hohe v. San Diego Unified School
District150
Nowhere is the ambiguity and inconsistency that currently fog
waiver law more apparent than in recent cases questioning the validity
of parental exculpatory agreements. Hohe v. San Diego Unified School
District was arguably the first case to even suggest that parents could
148. See Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 30 (quoting Mark A. Hruska, Defensive
Retailing and Teaching, Diving Equipment & Marketing Association Trade Show (Jan. 19,
1996)).
149. Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 30.
150. 274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1990).
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waive their children's tort claims. 15' In Hohe, the Court of Appeal for
the Fourth District of California enforced a parental waiver prohibit-
ing a high school student from bringing liability claims for injuries she
suffered during a school hypnotism show.152 Hohe, a fifteen year old
high school junior at Mission Bay High School in San Diego, was one
of about two dozen students chosen to be in the hypnotism show.1 53
As a condition of being allowed to participate, however, students had
to sign (or have signed on their behalf) release forms stating that they
agreed to release the school district from any liability that might
arise.1 54 Hohe's father signed the release on his daughter's behalf,
and she was subsequently injured when she slid from her chair half a
dozen times while under hypnosis. 15 5
In upholding Hohe's waiver, the court ignored well-established
rules against parental waivers and instead focused on the notion that
parents are allowed, under certain circumstances, to enter into con-
tracts on their child's behalf.156 But while parents had traditionally
been afforded significant contract powers over their children, those
powers had never been thought to encompass the ability to bind chil-
dren to exculpatory agreements. 15 7 Perhaps recognizing this, the Hohe
court explained its holding with but a single line: "A parent may con-
tract on behalf of his or her children."' 58 The case was never
appealed. 159
151. See King, Jr., supra note 8, at 714-15.
152. See Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 652 (Ct. App. 1990).
153. See id. at 648.
154. See id. The release form read as follows:
I agree to indemnify and hold you and any third parties harmless from any and all
liability, loss or damage (including reasonable attorney fees) caused by or arising
in any manner from my participation in the Magic of the Mind Show including
any utterances made by me during the above named show or material furnished
by me in connection with my participation in the show. I am solely responsible for
my appearance in the show and for any loss to any party arising therefrom.
Id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 649.
157. Parents have traditionally been afforded authority to bind their children to agree-
ments, to arbitrate malpractice claims, and to give a medical insurer a subrogation interest
for medical conditions tortiously caused by third parties. See King, Jr., supra note 8, at 717.
158. Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
159. See id.
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2. Reaffirming the Majority View: Scott v. Pacific West Mountain
Resort' 6
0
Hohe impliedly recognized that there are no inherent defects in
the contract side of a parental waiver equation when a parent enters
into an exculpatory agreement on the child's behalf.16 1 Assuming this
is true, it follows that parental waivers should only be invalidated if
they somehow augment the tort side of the waiver scale. Two years
after Hohe, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that parental
waivers do in fact augment the tort side of the waiver scale. 162
In Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, the Washington high court
voided a parental waiver signed on behalf of a twelve year old ski racer
who crashed while trying to negotiate a slalom course.' 63 In rejecting
the waiver signed by the boy's parents, the court began by following
the same path as many of its predecessors in deciding the question of
validity-it simply assumed that parental waivers were invalid because
previous courts had so held. 64 But the Washington court laudably
went further than most others by explaining that it was voiding the
parental waiver not simply because of precedent, but also because of
public policy. 165 Prior to Scott, courts often justified prohibitions
against parental waivers the same way they justified prohibitions
against minor waivers (i.e., that the rules were necessary to protect
minors against predatory adults, as well as their own imprudence). 166
Perhaps recognizing that parental waivers involve much different con-
siderations than minor waivers, the Scott court offered two new policy
arguments as to why tort interests should be augmented in parental
waiver scenarios: First, the court reasoned that since the law firmly
prohibits parents from waiving children's post-injury liability claims, it
160. 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992).
161. One of the few cases to cite Hohe as precedent, Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified School
District, stated that Hohe showed "[i] t is well established that a parent may execute a release
on behalf of his or her child." Aaris v. Las Vegas Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801,
805 (Ct. App. 1998).
162. See Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11-12 (Wash. 1992).
163. See id. at 8-10, 12.
164. See id. at 11 ("[I]t is settled law in many jurisdictions that, absent judicial or statu-
tory authority, parents have no authority to release a cause of action belonging to their
child.").
165. See id. at 11-12.
166. See Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 142
(E.D. Pa. 1987);Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 373, 373 n.1 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Fedor
v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 468 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958);
King, Jr., supra note 8, at 715.
[Vol. 36
should also prohibit parental waivers of pre-injury claims. 167 Second,
the court believed that allowing a parent who might be unwilling or
unable to care for an injured child to waive that child's liability claims
would effectively render the child helpless. 168 Subsequent courts and
commentators have cited these reasons as the main modern policy
arguments against parental waiver validity.' 69
3. Limited Exceptions to the Majority Rule: Zivich v. Mentor Soccer
Club 170
In 1998, the Ohio Supreme Court eschewed the normal workings
of the waiver scale to carve out a narrow exception for parental waiv-
ers used in the context of volunteer activities. 171 In Zivich v. Mentor
Soccer Club, the Ohio high court upheld a waiver signed by Pamela
Zivich on behalf of her seven year old son. 172 Zivich had been re-
quired to sign the waiver as a condition of her son being allowed to
participate in the 1993-94 season of the Mentor Soccer Club.173 The
club administered a nonprofit youth recreational soccer league. 174
After his team won a practice scrimmage, Zivich's son began
swinging on the uppermost beam of a soccer goal. 175 The unanchored
goal tipped over on top of the child, breaking his collarbone and
three ribs, and severely bruising his lungs. 176 The boy's parents filed
suit against the Mentor Soccer Club, alleging negligence and reckless
misconduct. 177 On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the claims of
both Zivich and her son were barred by the parental waiver Zivich had
signed. 178
In ruling that parental waivers were valid when used to protect
youth recreation volunteers, the court changed the fundamental way
in which the waiver scale functions. 179 Rather than presuming that
167. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12. Many states maintain statutes and common law rules
preventing parents from releasing a child's potential causes of action after the child has
been injured without court approval. See id. at 11.
168. See id. at 12.
169. See Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 206 (Ohio 1998); Purdy, supra
note 67, at 469-75.
170. 696 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1998).
171. See Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 207.
172. See id. at 202.
173. See id. at 202-03.
174. See id. at 202.
175. See id. at 203.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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public policy interests weighed against the contract side of parental
waiver equations, the court said there were considerable public policy
interests weighing in favor of such waivers.' 80 It further stated:
It cannot be disputed that volunteers in community recreational
activities serve an important function. Organized recreational activ-
ities offer children the opportunity to learn valuable life skills ....
Due in great part to the assistance of volunteers, nonprofit organi-
zations are able to offer these activities at minimal cost .... Yet the
threat of liability strongly deters many individuals from volunteer-
ing for nonprofit organizations .... Therefore, faced with the very
real threat of a lawsuit, and the potential for substantial damage
awards, nonprofit organizations and their volunteers could very
well decide that the risks are not worth the effort. Hence, invalida-
tion of exculpatory agreements would reduce the number of activi-
ties made possible through the uncompensated services of
volunteers and their sponsoring organizations. 18 1
Balancing the detriment of parental exculpatory agreements
against the overall social value of youth recreational sports, the court
concluded that the waiver scale tipped decidedly in favor of validity
when parental waivers are used to protect sports league volunteers. 18 2
"Public policy does not forbid such an agreement. In fact, public pol-
icy supports it. ' ' 183
Despite the unique approach of the Zivich court, the case sheds
significant light on the overall workings of the waiver scale. In dicta,
the court expounded on the argument curtly expressed in Hohe that
the authority traditionally afforded parents to raise their children
should also include the right to enter into parental exculpatory agree-
ments. 18 4 Citing the Ohio appellate court's concurrence, the Ohio Su-
preme Court noted that "the right of a parent to raise his or her child
is a natural right subject to the protections of due process." 185 This
language echoed the implicit argument of Hohe that parental waivers
do not inherently undermine the contract side of the waiver scale.
B. A New Era of Parental Waiver: Troxel v. Granville186
Two years after Zivich, the United States Supreme Court further
bolstered Hohe's pro-waiver argument by recognizing that parents
should be afforded broad authority over the care and upbringing of
180. See id.
181. Id. at 205.
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 206.
185. Id.
186. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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their children.'8 7 Troxel v. Granville involved an action for visitation
rights brought by the paternal grandparents of two young girls whose
father had committed suicide.' 88 The grandparents sought visitation
allowances of two weekends a month and two weeks each summer,
whereas the mother wanted to limit the grandparents' visits to a single
day each month.'8 9 The grandparents filed suit under a Washington
state statute which provided that "[t]he court may order visitation
rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the
child ... ."19o A Washington superior court granted the grandparents
visits of one weekend a month, one week during the summer, and
four hours on both grandparents' birthdays. 19' On appeal, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court ruled that the statute under which the grand-
parents sought visitation unconstitutionally infringed the
fundamental rights of parents to raise their children. 192
In affirming the Washington Supreme Court's ruling, the United
States Supreme Court officially recognized for the first time the broad
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children.193 Writing
for the plurality, Justice O'Connor stated, "it cannot now be doubted
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children. '194 Although Justice
O'Connor did not define the precise scope of these parental rights, it
can be argued that the right of "care, custody and control" should
firmly encompass the right to enter into valid parental exculpatory
agreements.
III. Solution
Those courts that traditionally voided parental waivers on con-
tract grounds apparently believed that parents simply overstepped the
bounds of contract by entering into release agreements on their chil-
dren's behalf.' 95 But Troxel seems to recognize that a parent does not
187. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
188. See id. at 60-61.
189. See id. at 61.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 63.
193. See generally id. at 66.
194. Id.
195. See Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir. 1960);
Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 372 n.1 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403
A.2d 1206, 1208 (Me. 1979); Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tenn. Ct.
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in fact violate any rules of contract by entering into exculpatory agree-
ments on a child's behalf.196 Therefore, provided all other require-
ments are met (i.e., conspicuousness, unambiguousness, no
overreaching), parental waivers should be afforded the same contract
weight as any other release agreement entered into between con-
senting adults.
Those courts that traditionally voided parental waivers on tort
grounds apparently believed that such waivers allowed children to fall
victim either to opportunistic adults or their own naivet. 1 97 But
again, children are far less vulnerable to exploitation and bad judg-
ment when their parents are scrutinizing prospective waiver agree-
ments. The public policy rationale often used to void minor
exculpatory agreements therefore does not apply to parental waivers.
Regarding the more modern policy arguments against parental
waivers first advanced in Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort,'98 subse-
quent cases and commentaries have exposed serious gaps in the Scott
court's reasoning. 99 As such, the tort side of the waiver scale should
not be afforded greater weight when parental exculpatory agreements
are involved.
Given that both the contract and tort sides of the parental waiver
scale are afforded the same weight as any traditional waiver equation,
parental waivers should be categorically enforced. 200 This break from
traditional rules prohibiting parental waivers can ideally be accom-
plished through state legislation or, more realistically, widespread ju-
dicial validation of parental exculpatory agreements.
App. 1989); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 10-11 (Wash. 1992); King, Jr.,
supra note 8, at 713-14.
196. See Troxe4 530 U.S. at 66.
197. See Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 142
(E.D. Pa. 1987); Dressel, 623 P.2d at 373 n.1; Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am.,
Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 468 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958); Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12; King, Jr., supra
note 8, at 715.
198. See Scott, 834 P.2d at 11-12.
199. See Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 206-07 (Ohio 1998);
Purdy, supra note 67, at 472-75.
200. Since many states currently follow common law waiver laws stating that exculpa-
tory agreements are presumed valid unless violative of public policy, statutes therefore
could be enacted stating that parental waivers are not inherently violative.
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A. Parental Waiver Scale Mechanics: The Contract Side
1. Care, Custody, and Control
That a parent's right of "care, custody, and control"20 1 should en-
compass the right to waive children's liability claims is evident from
the plain meaning of the words themselves, as well as the very nature
of services that make use of exculpatory agreements.
a. Plain Meaning
According to plain meaning, "care" is responsibility for the safety
and well-being of others; 20 2 "custody" is the duty to guard and pre-
serve one's well-being; 20 3 and most importantly, "control" is the au-
thority to guide or manage one's affairs.20 4 When used in the context
of parental authority, these terms clearly refer to a broad right of pa-
rental dominion over the guidance and well-being of the child. In-
deed, Webster's Dictionary even lists parental authority as one of the
paradigmatic uses of the word "control."20 5
A broad reading of parental Due Process rights is further justified
by Justice O'Connor's remarks in Troxel:
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children
([i.e.], is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to in-
ject itself into the private realm of the family to further question
the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the
rearing of that parent's children .... [206]
[I]f a fit parent's decision ... becomes subject to judicial review,
the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's
own determination .... [207]
[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on
the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions
simply because a state judge believes a "better" decision could be
made. 208
The Supreme Court apparently advocates a hands off approach
to regulating the day-to-day choices and value judgments parents
make in raising their children.
201. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
202. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrIoNARY 338 (1993).
203. See id. at 559.
204. See id. at 496.
205. See id.
206. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69.
207. Id. at 70.
208. Id. at 72-73.
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b. Nature of Services Using Exculpatory Agreements
That this penumbra of parental authority should encompass the
right to draft valid parental exculpatory agreements is clear from the
very nature of services that require liability waivers. Although waivers
can only be used in the context of nonessential services such as sports
and recreation, these services contribute immensely to the mental,
physical, and social development of children. As one leading authority
on child waivers put it:
Youth recreational activities can begin to fill the growing void in
the lives of many young people. Positive habits can be developed
and reinforced, self-esteem enhanced, and emulation of suitable
role models encouraged .... [Y] outh athletics and other activities
offer a respite from television and various sources of media vio-
lence that have been tied to youth violence as well as to ... other
adverse behavioral and psychological effects .... 209
Recognizing their inability to procure valid waivers, several ser-
vice industries have already limited or excluded minor participation
altogether. 21° Consequently, parents are deprived of the full range of
childrearing choices that might otherwise be available to them if pa-
rental waivers were allowed. While many children admittedly are not
physically or mentally suited to jump from airplanes, scuba dive across
coral reefs, or even play in recreational soccer leagues, parents should
at least have these choices available to them. As Helen Keller once
said, "Security is . . . a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor
do . . . children . . . as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no
safer in the long run than outright exposure. Life is either a daring
adventure or nothing."211 Risk, in other words, is everywhere. But
when the law prevents service providers from reasonably insulating
themselves from legal attack by children, providers in turn decide
which risks children will be exposed to. These risk-benefit choices are
precisely the kind of "childrearing" decisions that the United States
Constitution reserves exclusively for parents, not service providers.
209. King, Jr., supra note 8, at 688-89.
210. See Arango & Trueba, Jr., supra note 6, at 47. Airborne sports such as hang-gliding
and skydiving have excluded minors entirely, whereas the scuba industry has limited mi-
nors to dives of certain depths, and the ski industry has limited certain minors to specified
slopes. See id. at 47-48.
211. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
ELAINE T. PARTNOW, QUOTABLE WOMAN 173 (1978)).
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2. Troxel's Impact on the Waiver Scale: Cooper v. United States Ski
Ass'n2
Colorado courts have already recognized that Troxel's rights of
care, custody, and control include the right to waive children's liability
claims. 213 In Cooper v. United States Ski Ass'n, the mother of a seventeen
year old downhill ski racer signed a liability waiver as a condition of
her son being allowed to compete with the Aspen Valley Ski Club.
2 1 4
The waiver stated in capital letters that the signor agreed to release
the Aspen Valley Ski Club from liability that might arise from partici-
pation with the club's competitive ski racing team.215 While training
for the "Super G," a high-speed ski race, David Cooper lost control
and crashed into a tree bordering the ski run.2 1 6 He sustained severe
injuries to both his eyes, causing total and permanent blindness.21 7
Upon turning eighteen years old, Cooper and his parents filed
suit against the Aspen Valley Ski Club, charging negligence and
breach of contract.218 The trial court granted summary judgment to
the ski club on all counts, ruling that the waiver signed by David's
mother validly insulated the defendant from liability.2 1 9 Cooper
appealed. 220
Stressing that the question of whether a parent may release a
child's liability claims was "an issue of first impression" in Colorado,
the appellate court began by finding the mere fact that Cooper had
filed suit for breach of contract did not ratify the original release
agreement. 221 Turning then to the harder question of whether par-
ents are precluded as a matter of law from waiving children's liability
claims, the court concluded that parental exculpatory agreements
were paradigm examples of the kinds of parental childrearing choices
reserved exclusively for parents by Troxel.222 As the trial court stated:
Thousands of such releases are signed each year by parents enroll-
ing their children in almost every kind of school and recreational
activity. Parents in executing or not executing such releases make
212. 32 P.2d 502.
213. See generally Cooper v. United States Ski Ass'n, 32 P.2d 502, 507 (Colo. Ct. App.
2000).
214. See id. at 504.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 505.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 507
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conscious choices on behalf of their children concerning risks and
benefits of participation in a program that may involve risk. Those
decisions are individual and based upon circumstances of each
family and activity. Those are proper parental choices on behalf of
their children which should not be ignored. So long as the deci-
sion is voluntary and informed, it should be given the same dignity
as decisions regarding schooling, medical treatment and religious
education. 2 23
Both reason and precedent illustrate that parents do not under-
mine the contract side of the waiver scale by entering into parental
exculpatory agreements. Therefore, courts will only be able to con-
tinue invalidating such agreements upon a showing that parental waiv-
ers augment the tort side of the waiver scale. It is difficult, however, to
make such a showing.
B. Parental Waiver Scale Mechanics Continued: The Tort Side
The anti-parental waiver policy arguments advanced by Scott, that
parental waivers are analogous to post-injury waivers and that parental
waivers effectively allow parents to deprive children of immediate
damage recovery, both have serious flaws. 224
1. Comparing Pre- and Post-Injury Releases
First, it is impossible to compare parental release of a child's post-
injury claims to pre-injury parental exculpatory agreements. Post-in-
jury situations involve unique pressures and incentives that are not
present in pre-injury waiver scenarios. 225 Such factors can spur parents
to act against their children's interests in ways that would not normally
occur in pre-injury waiver situations. As one prominent criticism of
Scott noted:
When a parent releases or settles a child's claim, a conflict of inter-
est with the child's rights may arise. For example, when a parent
accepts a settlement for a child's claim and signs an indemnity
agreement, the parent becomes liable to the defendant for any
damages the child recovers. This creates a strong motive for the
parent not to sue .... At times parents may also act ignorantly, or
may be coerced or defrauded into signing a release or settlement.
For example, they might release a claim hastily in the immediate
aftermath of an accident. Parents coping with an injured child may
be susceptible to offers of a quick settlement. The emotional
trauma and financial pressure of the child's injury may compel the
223. Id.
224. See Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 206-07 (Ohio 1998); see also
Purdy, supra note 67, at 472-75.
225. See Purdy, supra note 67, at 474.
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parents to agree to an immediately attractive but ultimately inade-
quate settlement, or prevent them from inquiring into terms that
they normally would question. 226
None of these pressures are present in pre-injury waiver situa-
tions. In these instances, parents have no incentive, either financial or
otherwise, to act against their child's best interests. In fact, parents
faced with a pre-injury waiver situation have every incentive not to
agree to waiver terms unless they are in the child's best interests. As
the Scott critique further noted:
The concerns underlying ... [judicial] ... reluctance to allow
parents to dispose of a child's existing claim do not arise in the
situation where a parent waives a child's future claim. A parent
dealing with an existing claim is simultaneously coping with an in-
jured child; such a situation creates a potential for parental action
contrary to that child's ultimate best interests. A parent who signs a
release before her child participates in recreational activity, how-
ever, faces an entirely different situation. First, such a parent has
no financial motivation to sign the release. To the contrary, be-
cause a parent must pay for medical care, she risks her financial
interests by signing away the right to recover damages. Thus, the
parent would better serve her financial interests by refusing to sign
the release. A parent who dishonestly or maliciously signs a
preinjury release in deliberate derogation of his child's best inter-
est.., seems unlikely .... Moreover, parents are less vulnerable to
coercion and fraud in a preinjury setting .... A parent signing a
future release is thus more able to reasonably assess the possible
consequences of waiving a right to sue.227
2. Depriving Children of Immediate Recovery
Scott's second rationale, that parental waivers may deprive chil-
dren of immediate recovery of tort damages, is equally flawed. Even
under the current system of law, a parent would often be able to deny
a child the right of immediate recovery should the child be injured.228
During the age of minority, a parent usually has ultimate say over
whether a child can bring action for personal injury, thereby effec-
tively retaining control over whether the child can recover any mone-
tary damages. As the Scott criticism stated:
[The] law effectively gives parents the power to initiate their chil-
dren's litigation. Children under the age of eighteen cannot liti-
gate except through a guardian. While children over fourteen
226. Id. at 473.
227. Id. at 473-74.
228. See id. at 472 ("Most jurisdictions ... accept the proposition that parents cannot
settle or release their children's existing tort claims without judicial or statutory
approval.").
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years old may apply independently for a court-appointed guardian,
a relative or friend must apply for children under fourteen years
old. If their parents do not bring suit, children have only one op-
tion: the statute of limitations on most actions for negligence is
tolled during minority, and thus children can bring suit after they
turn eighteen .... [Because] children cannot litigate on their own,
parents already possess the power to hamper their children's ability
to recover damages.2 29
Rules preventing parents from waiving their child's liability
claims are thus moot if their purpose is to protect the child's right to
recover immediate damages.
3. Fundamental Fairness
It would also be inherently inconsistent to say that a parent has a
fundamental right to waive a child's future liability claims but that
public policy might negate such waivers. A right is not a right unless it
has some legal consequence. Service providers who enter into paren-
tal exculpatory agreements under such circumstances would be put in
the grossly unfair position of having to play "musical contract parties"
if different public policy rules could be applied to parental waivers.
Although the service provider under such circumstances would be
contracting with the parent, the rules governing the agreement would
effectively be determined by the child. In effect, the service provider
would have a binding exculpatory agreement only until the child de-
cided otherwise. Such a result would be fundamentally unfair to ser-
vice providers.
Conclusion
Children are indeed one of society's most precious resources.
Easily prone to both bad business decisions and exploitation by oppor-
tunistic adults,23 0 children need to be insulated from many business
scenarios in which their lack of sophistication and naivet6 can lead to
unconscionable results. But upon careful scrutiny, it is clear that pa-
rental waivers do not present one of those scenarios. The mere fact
that a parent signs a liability waiver on a child's behalf should not
undermine the contract weight normally afforded to the waiver.
Clearly, then, the contract side of the waiver scale is not lightened in
229. Id. at 469-70.
230. See Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 142
(E.D. Pa. 1987); see also Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 372 n.1 (Colo. 1981) (en banc);
Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 467 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1958); King, Jr., supra note 8, at 715.
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typical parental waiver scenarios. Conversely, there are no compelling
public policy reasons why children should be afforded heightened
protection from parental waivers; as such, the tort side of the waiver
scale should not be augmented. The waiver scale proves that parental
waivers, barring some basic contract flaw, should be valid. Any other
result would violate parents' constitutionally guaranteed rights of do-
minion over the upbringing of their children.
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